When women rally

A quantitative study of the association between women´s participation in nonviolent civil resistance and democratization.

my RQ is how women´s participation in nonviolent resistance, influence/affects/ is associated with democratization…🡨 working on it.

# INTRODUCTION

Since the third wave of democratization, in 1974, 71 countries have experienced democratic transitions. However, today, only 12 of these countries are liberal democracies, 39 are minimally democratic and 20 have returned to autocracy (Pinckney, 2020, p. 2). For instance, both Egypt and Tunisia succeeded in abolishing the dictator after the Arab Spring in 2010-2012, but only Tunisia succeeded in their transition to democracy, while Egypt is still today authoritarian. This begs the question; *What explains why some countries transition to democracy, while others do not?*

Several theories have been suggested when trying to answer this question. Many highlights that structural and economic conditions are key elements for democratization. (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1991; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997).

Others have seen how elite’s and the regime´s “pillars of support” is vital for the survival of autocracies, hence claiming that the elite´s willingness and acceptance for regime change is crucial for successful democratization (Burton et al., 1992; O’Donnell et al., 1986; Peeler, 1992; Przeworski, 1991, pp. 77-78). However, there is also an agency approach that focuses on*who* the actors involved in pro-democratic movements are, and *how* the actors involved influence the outcome (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth, 2021; Dahlum et al., 2019; Olson, 1993; Wood, 2001). This premise, that *actors* in popular movements play an important role in the transition to democracy, forms the foundation of this thesis.

Traditionally, scholars have disagreed on *which* social groups are key actors in popular movements. Earlier, some argued that the peasants, under certain conditions, are key figures in a democratic revolutions (Stephens, 1989). Later, the disagreement was between which urban groups were more effective in promoting democracy. Some argued that revolutions for democracy can only succeed if the bourgeoisie are involved (Moore, 1966), others hold that industrial workers and labor movements, because of their high organizational capacity, are the key agents in democratization (Butcher et al., 2018; Collier & Mahoney, 1999). Moreover, urban middle classes are thought to be key actors in other works (Ansell & Samuels, 2014), and the poor as the “biggest threat to autocracies (Boix, 2003). Recent findings shows how movements that are dominated by industrial workers, or the urban middle classes have a higher success rate in democratization (Dahlum et al., 2019, p. 1494). Hence, *who* revolts matters.

However, the effect of women’s participation in popular movements and democratization was, until recently, largely overlooked in the academic literature. Studies in the 1970´s and 1990´s did debate women´s and political, economic, and social participation in democracies (Brinton, 1993; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Flammang, 1997; Gilligan, 1977; Oakley & Cracknell, 1981; Rosen, 1995), but few looked specifically at the effect of women´s mobilization and democratization. This might be because women were not considered important actors in democratic transitions (Teele, 2018, p. 15). Waylen (1993) examined the relationship between women´s movements and democratic *consolidation* in Latin – America, but later identified that researchers had a poor understanding of the interplay between gender relations and democratization. She concluded that “any analysis of democratization that fails to incorporate a gendered perspective will be flawed” (Waylen, 1994, pp. 327-328). This argument coincides with the conclusion in Chenoweth´s (2019) report where she argues “that excluding a discussion of women´s power regarding the outcomes of mass movement is likely incomplete” (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 6-7).

The focus on women´s role is different aspects of war, peace and democracy has however, increased dramatically the last 20 years and especially after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in 2000[[1]](#footnote-1) (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 3). For instance, evidence from post conflict African countries shows a higher rates of female legislative representation and faster trajectory of adopting women´s right reforms because women’s groups seized the opportunity for political reform conflict, compared to non-post conflict countries (Tripp, 2015, pp. 33-35). This is in line with the findings of Webster et.al (2019) who show how warfare, at least in short or medium term, can disrupt social institutions and lead to an increase in women´s empowerment via mechanisms related to role shifts across society and political shifts catalyzed by war (Webster et al., 2019, p. 255). Regarding post-conflict peace agreements, several studies have found a robust correlation between women’s participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace (Caprioli et al., 2010; Gizelis, 2009; Krause et al., 2018; Principe, 2017 ). Peace agreements with women signatories have a higher quality, in terms of sociopolitical changes, and higher implementation rates than those with few or no women signatories. This is explained through collaboration with diverse women’s groups, especiallybetween those in representative positions- female delegates- and civil society groups during the peace process (Krause et al., 2018, pp. 985-988).The latest contribution to this field of study found a strong link between female political empowerment and civil peace by drawing on global data over a 200- year period (1817-2017) (Dahlum & Wig, 2020, p. 879). Regarding women and democratization, one study found that in countries with an advance in women’s political empowerment and rights prior to the Arab Spring were the ones most likely to transition successfully to democracy (Moghadam, 2014).

Compared to women´s role in war and peace agreements, the effect of women´s participation in nonviolent movements have, however, been less explored. Recent studies show how women`s participation clearly influences campaign´s nonviolent discipline and probability of campaign success (Chenoweth, 2019b; Marks & Chenoweth, 2020), and that higher levels of gender equality, regardless of democracy level, results in a higher likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 762). But few have looked at the connection between female participation and democratization. Accordingly, there is a need for more quantitative data on the roles women play in nonviolent campaigns and the prospect of democratization (Principe, 2017 p. 1). One reason for this lack could be because data on the matter has, until recently, been unavailable. However, in 2019, The Women in Resistance (WiRe) Data set was published (Chenoweth, 2019a). WiRe catalogues women’s participation in 338 maximalist (violent and nonviolent) resistance campaigns (i.e. those campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government or territorial self-determination) in every country in the world from 1945-2014. From this, the report *“Women´s participation and the fate of nonviolent campaigns”,* was published (Chenoweth, 2019b). As the first ever, she uses the Women in Resistance (WiRe) data set and presents five main findings. First, ninety-nine percent of nonviolent campaigns featured frontline women´s participation compared with seventy-six percent of violent campaigns. Second, the greater role of women in campaigns (in terms of observable numerical participation), the larger the correlation with nonviolent methods, even in highly repressive contexts. Movement with both women’s frontline participation and the more formal involvement of women´s organizations are more likely to maintain nonviolent discipline. Third, frontline women´s participation is highly correlated with successful resistance campaigns. This is also true after controlling for other factors such as campaign size. Fourth, women´s participation is associated with gender equality- which is measured with lower fertility rates- after a nonviolent campaign has succeeded. This effect is not the same for violent campaigns. Fifth, the descriptive findings in the report show that excluding a discussion of women´s power regarding the outcomes of mass movement is likely incomplete (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 6-7).

Building further on this report, Marks & Chenoweth (2020) finds strong evidence of a substantial increase of egalitarian democracy in countries where women have participated in resistance movements against the regime (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). Extensive women’s frontline participation (observed numerical participation) nearly doubles the predicted score of egalitarian democracy five years after the movements ends compared to movements with no women participants. However, this only applies when such campaigns succeed. Higher rates of women observed in campaigns led to a greater risk of backlash and repression if the campaign failed (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). The same is true for democracy levels. In failed-nonviolent campaigns with large numbers of women’s participation, the egalitarian democracy level drops five years after the uprising, which may indicate a high desire for revenge from authoritarian actors against women who have challenged the male-dominated system through mass participation (p. 5). This study[[2]](#footnote-2) is the closest to what this thesis wishes to explore. However, I wish to make three new contributions to this(this is still a work in progress). First, the research has been focusing on the correlation between women´s frontline participation and campaign success, and less on the causal story behind this. I wish to elaborate and provide mechanisms about *how* women participation is associated with campaign success/democratization. I also expand the current research, who has for now only looked at women´s frontline participation, by including other participatory roles and present theory of how each of them affects democratization differently. Two, Marks & Chenoweth (2020) find a positive association between women´s frontline participation on *egalitarian* democracy. However, in addition to exploring this association on several participatory roles, my thesis also includes the polyarchy democracy score. Therefore, my second contribution will be to look at a broader set of democracy indicators. Three, based on previous research, women´s participation is positively associated with campaign success (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 2; Principe, 2017 ). However, this is argued to be conditioned on whether the campaign itself succeeds (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). This link has only been drawn based on women´s frontline participation, and the association between female participation and success on future democracy score has not previously been explored (quantitatively). Therefore, I wish to explore this connection by adding an interaction term between “success” and women´s participation (in three different roles). With this, I assume, in the lines with Marks and Chenoweth (2020), that the effect of women participation on democracy score depend on success.

## Conceptualization of democracy and women´s participation

### Democracy

This thesis will use two concepts of democracy when exploring the association between women´s participation in civil resistance and future democracy score. The first concept of democracy is through Dahl´s (1956) “polyarchy democracy” term. Polyarchy is, according to Dahl, the most sufficient way to define democracy since there are many conditions for democracy that the (western) democracies did not meet. The concept of polyarchy thus became the basis for describing the characteristics of liberal democracy from the 1970s (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 29). Within this “traditional” understanding, there are three prerequisites that needs to be secured to be labeled a (polyarchy) democracy. First, democracy exists when leaders achieve power trough free and fair elections (Schumpeter, 1976). Two, when all relevant political forces agree to submit their interest and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions and continue the “peaceful play”. More specifically, when the losing side tries again within the same institutions under which they have lost (Lipset, 1959b; Przeworski, 1991, p. 26). Third, democracy exists where there is near-universal suffrage and basic freedoms like freedom to organize, freedom of speech, and freedom to stand for election (Dahl, 1973, p. 2). In addition to these basic components, liberal democracy reflects the liberal traditions within democracy. Among others, liberal democracies must involve rule of law, ensure respect for civil rights and balance power between the executive and legislature branch (Luhrmann, 2019, p. 897).

Nevertheless, even though these definitions have a long intellectual history, these are a narrow and restricted institutional definition of democracy (Bråten, 2018, p. 238; Waylen, 1994, p. 331). Liberal democracy does emphasize “respect for civil rights”, however, there is no mention of which conditions that must exist in order for all citizens to properly engage in the democracy (Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 598). A truly democratic approach dos not only pay attention to the procedures – the how- of democratic decision making- but also must include the *who* of decision- making (Bråten, 2018, p. 239). In the context of this thesis, the *who* are the women. Given the theoretical connection between democracy and equality, where inequality among different social groups is a democratic obstacle because it inhibits the full exercise of people’s formal democratic rights and political participation, it may seem that democracy and gender equality should go hand in hand (Houle, 2009; Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 598)[[3]](#footnote-3). Yet, historically democratic theory has excluded women (Beer, 2009; Bråten, 2018; Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 596). Many democracy -scholars find no contradiction in categorizing political systems as “democratic” even when women are not allowed to vote (Beer, 2009). A wider definition of democracy, that also includes a gendered perspective, has consequently been debated (Held, 1987; Landman, 2018; Pateman, 1989; Razavi, 2001; Waylen, 1994). Scholars today are therefore increasingly more attentive to the connection between democratic procedures, rights and freedoms, and the extent to which they apply equally across citizens (Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 595). In this sense, egalitarian democracy can provide a broader understanding of democracy, partly because it views equality as a prerequisite for democratic participation. For a country to be labeled as an egalitarian democracy, three preconditions must be accomplished. First, the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals must be equal across all social groups; second, resources must be distributed equally across all social groups; and third, groups and individuals must enjoy equal access to power (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, et al., 2021, p. 41).

However, one might argue that to establish an egalitarian democracy, the institutional prerequisites must be in place. Hence, egalitarian democracy might not be able to exist without the institutional components which facilitate democratic principles and practices. Only when they are in place, the egalitarian principles can follow. Based on this argument, this thesis will use both concepts of democracy when exploring the association between women´s participation in civil resistance and future democracy score.

#### Democratization

Democratization is as a process towards the ideal goals of democracy, and autocratization as a process away from them (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 30; Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 2).

There is further an assumption that democratization tends to unfold in a set of sequence of stages (Carothers, 2002, p. 7). First, there is the opening. This is a period of democratic ferment and political liberalization that shows cracks and weakness in the ruling regime (Carothers, 2002, p. 7). After that follows the breakthrough, also labeled transition. Transition refers to the period between the breakdown of one political regime and the establishment of another and the emergence of a democratic system with a new government through national elections and often with a new constitution (Pinckney, 2020, p. 45; Carothers, 2002, p. 7). After the transition comes consolidation. This is often a slow process in “which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance” through the strengthening of democratic institutions and regularization of elections (Carothers, 2002, p. 7).

This thesis will therefore understand democratization as a process consisting of these three stages, with an especially focus on the opening and transition phase and how female participation in nonviolent resistance affect the outcome of these two stages[[4]](#footnote-4). 🡨 Still working on this…

### Women´s participation

Women have always played a part in organizing resistance (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 1), but their contributions have often been underestimated or forgotten in the historical narrative (Eglitis & Zelče, 2013; Jaquette, 2018, pp. 2-3). Women have been central in the downfall of several oppressive regimes, for instance in several countries in Latin-America, and in Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 3). However, women´s participation in resistance campaigns is not homogenous, but rather complex and sometimes overlapping. This is because *“(…) women play a multiplicity of roles, as peace activists, as domestic or economy-saving labor, as logistical and health care supporters, and/or as active participants in agitating for regime change*” (Sjoberg & Whooley, 2015, p. 264)

Hence, women can participate in resistance campaigns in different ways and through different roles. There are further several ways to conceptualize these roles. Chenoweth (2019) presents several different categories, where three are especially relevant for this thesis because they present the strongest link to increased probability of democratization (Chenoweth, 2019, pp. 28- 33). These three are frontline participation, women in formal campaign leadership and participation of formal women´s organization. One way to divide these roles is between informal and formal participation. Resistance campaigns are often made up of coalitions of informal participants and groups, and formal organizations (+leaders) (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 2). By following this divide, I will be better able to evaluate if there is a difference in association between grass-root dissident and formal roles in the campaign on democratization.

The informal dimension cover frontline participation because they focus more on the individual/numeric observation of women participation. The formal dimension conceptualizes women in formal campaign leadership or through the participation of women´s organizations, constituting the more “hands- on”, active and organized association of women participation.

### Frontline roles

Women in frontline roles describes women observed in terms of observed numerical participation in a campaign (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 1). When women are *observed* as campaign -participants in the they are hence participating in frontline roles (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 7). For instance, there was an unprecedented high level of female participation in several of the civil resistance campaign in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen during the Arab Spring (Tnani, 2020, p. 1). During the protests in Egypt in 2011, some estimate that 50 percent of the campaign participants was female (Sjoberg & Whooley, 2015, p. 267)[[5]](#footnote-5). This is not a new phenomenon. Ninety nine percent of nonviolent campaigns from 1945-2014 have had frontline women´s participation to some extent (Chenoweth, 2019b, pp. 3 &14).

### Formal leadership roles

Historically, leadership roles in civil resistance have been occupied by men (Morris & Staggeborg, 2004, p. 177). However, since WWII, women in leadership position in civil resistance campaigns has increased (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 8). For instance, in Sudan the women were visible leaders, and the leadership of the student Alah Saleh eventually resulted in a breakdown of the old regime in Sudan in 2019 (Tønnessen, 2020; Handique, 2020).

Conceptualizing women in leadership roles in a civil resistance campaign can, however, be tricky because women are often excluded from the top formal leadership positions in favor of other secondary leadership roles (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 177). Robnett (1997) argues that women in civil resistance function as a “bridge leader”, which is defined as a “intermediate layer of leadership, whose task includes bridging potential constituents and potential formal leaders to the movement” (p.19). This can indicate that women might have been excluded from the analytic meaning of the concept of leadership because their “type of leadership” positions might not fit into the common understanding of campaign leadership (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 177). This distinction might also be the reason why “quantifiable data on how female leadership influence a movement´s ability to achieve its goals is lacking” (Principe, 2017, p. 9-10). However, in the WiRE data set defines women´s participation as leaders as either *among* formal leadership or *primary* leaders of a campaign (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 30), making it possible to actually take the distinction in to account and explore the effect of women in secondary leadership roles in a campaign.

### Formal women`s organization

Formal women´s organizations means women´s organizations with formal titles (Chenoweth, 2019a, p. 32). Formal organizations are central in every phase of a democratization process, from mobilizing people, sustaining, and coordinating acts of resistance to form fronts and cooperation between different groups and negotiating with regimes (Butcher et al., 2018; McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 2011). Democratization is therefore more likely to happen when strong and durable organizations mobilize against an autocratic regime (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 136; Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3). Historically, such organizations have been religious organizations, trade unions, professional organizations and women’s organizations (Butcher et al., 2022, p. 3; Butcher et al., 2018). Women´s organizations have played a major role in several maximalist campaigns (Jaquette, 2001, p. 112; Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 183). For instance, the Tunisian women´s organization *Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates, (ATFD),* played an instrumental role in the democratization in Tunisia, especially in the transition after the overthrown of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali´s regime (Deane, 2013, p. 13; Labidi, 2014, p. 1; Refle, 2016, p. 5).

These three roles constitute this thesis main independent variables. I will further elaborate their specific mechanisms in the theory chapter.

# Theory

## Democratization in the context of nonviolent maximalist civil resistance campaigns

## Phase 1: Campaign success (The opening)

There are three core assumption that motivates the agency approach and links civil resistance to regime change. One, power is based on legitimacy rather than coercion. If a large amount of people stop voluntarily complying, the power is difficult to restore (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 31). Two, power is never monolithic, and regimes rely upon the “pillars of support”, or elites, in order to stay in power. Mass mobilization can pull the pillars of support away from the power holders, causing the government to collapse. Three, power is never permanent and power holders must constantly renew their power (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 34). Hence, if civil resistance campaigns occur, it reveals that this legitimacy is in crisis and the *opening*, which shows cracks and weakness in the ruling regime, has begun.

However, the occurrence of civil resistance campaigns dos not necessary mean that democratization will happen. In fact, half of all pro-democratic movements fail and more than half are not democracies five years after (Chenoweth et al., 2011, p. 215). There is huge variation within nonviolent resistance campaigns that affect the probability of a campaign to succeed with *initial* democratization. Kurt Shock (2005) introduced two key concepts that civil resistance campaigns should possess in order to increase its probability of success. These are resilience and leverage. Resilience refers to “the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of the opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities”. Leverage is described as “the ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power” i.e., the pillars of support.  (Shock, 2005, pp. 142-143).

There are especially three resilience and leverage mechanisms that is often cited as key to campaign success (in the short term).

### Big, and diversified campaigns.

Numbers matter, and large-scale civil resistance is impossible to ignore by the political elites. Mass-participation disrupts the status quo and makes continued repression from the regime impossible to sustain. In addition, and as an important point, it often prompts defections from its opponents’ pillars of support and the state security forces (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 83; Schock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Pillars of support and state security forces is of critical value for illiberal regimes because they are instruments of coercion and oppression, and police and military institutions have the potential to sanction or stop potential challengers of the regime (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 411). A nonviolent campaigns is 46 times more likely to succeed if a regime´s security force defect, voice support for- or join- the campaign (Chenoweth et al., 2011).

In addition to campaign seize, diversity in the campaign is an important feature. The more diverse a campaign´s base of participants is, the more likely it is to succeed (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 83). A diverse representation in gender, age, religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic status and ideology, will increase a campaigns **legitimacy** and make it challenging for the regime to isolate certain groups for repression. This will increases the likelihood of adopting indiscriminate tactics by the regime that will garner backlash from security forces and pillars of support (Chenoweth et al., 2011; Principe, 2017 p. 3; Schock, 2005). In addition, diversity increases access to new knowledge and resources which contributes to development of new tactics while building resilience (Principe, 2017 ; Schock, 2005).

### Diverse Use of Nonviolent Methods.

If the resistance campaign uses a diverse set of nonviolent methods and tactical innovation this will increase both the leverage and resilience of a nonviolent campaign (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Nonviolent campaigns that draw upon their vast human capital to create new and unexpected tactics are more likely to succeed than movements that only rely on a single method. This is because they are often better at maintaining momentum compared to movements that are predictable and tactically stagnant, and because it makes it more difficult for the regime to predict and adjust its counter-methods (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 87). In addition, a diverse use of methods attracts more diverse participants which increases mobilization capacity (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145).

### Keeping a nonviolent discipline.

Maintaining nonviolent discipline throughout the civil resistance campaign is important for several reasons (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014; Chenoweth, 2021; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Schock, 2005; Sharp, 1973). First, when campaigns can keep nonviolent discipline, movements will **maximize civilian participation** by decreasing participation barriers. Higher numbers of participants and involvement build legitimacy and enhance a movement´s leverage. Second, keeping a nonviolent discipline, even if the regime responds violently, increases the probability of success[[6]](#footnote-6). Third, security forces are rarely comfortable with being ordered to use violent against nonviolent people, and if the regime answers with violent counterattacks, this will in turn increase the likelihood of defection from key pillars of support and security forces (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014, p. 8; Principe, 2017 p. 3; Schock, 2005, pp. 143-145). In addition, nonviolent movements experience more internal and external support. Increasing external and internal support could affect the regimes willingness to conceding to campaign demands. These are key elements that contributes to differential in success rates between violence and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns (Chenoweth et al., 2011, p. 30).

When these three mechanisms are present, three critical trends are more likely to emerge. One, increasing civilian participation, two, diminishing impact of repression and three, increase backfire and defections from the movements opponent (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014, p. 5). The combination of these trends, high numbers, diversity, tactical innovation, and nonviolent discipline is all a part of sustaining the movement and increasing the probability of regime breakdown.

## Phase 2: The transition

The previous section does argue a plausible link between nonviolent campaigns and regime breakthrough, especially if the campaign possesses certain resilience and leverage mechanisms. However, even if the protest movement achieves their initial breakthrough, they will face a second challenge of maintaining high levels of civic mobilization also through the transition period where the goal is to establish new, democratic, political institutions (Pinckney et al.,2020, p. 5)[[7]](#footnote-7).

Pinckney (2020) argues that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to transition into democracy because of the opportunities such campaigns presents. One, providing opportunity for defection and two, more easily return to broad-mass participation against the regime to hold the regime accountable. Based on this assumption, he hypothesizes two key elements that should be present for a successful transition to democracy. One, high levels of mobilization capacity and two, low levels of maximalism.

### High levels of transitional mobilization

First, high levels of mobilization means that a resistance movement must continue mobilization through the transition, also called *transitional mobilization* (Pinckney, 2020, p. 11 & 30).A movement must “maintain a level of civic engagement, public pressure and protest during the transition that is like the level of engagement during the period of struggle against the old regime” (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). By doing this, the elites will be held accountable and ensure that the masses maintain the temporary power advantage of a nonviolent revolution until new institutions are in place (Pinckney, 2020, p. 11). Continued mobilization in the transition period can push the countries democratic transition forward (Pinckney, 2020, p. 7). For instance, if new leaders, and especially leader figures from the campaigns, are to be placed in positions of influence, this are more likely to happened when the power holders fear the consequences if they ignore the popular demands (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). Consequently, high levels of mobilization capacity could increase the participation of civil society and external actors[[8]](#footnote-8) in the transition negotiations. The participation of civil society and external actors is vital for political and democratic development (Krause et al., 2018, p. 989). When external actors, especially the ones who participated in the initial mobilization, is involved in peace- and democratic- negotiations during the transition, they encourage and incentivize states to introduce affirmative action mechanism that might strengthen democratic institutions and transparency (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 997).

### Low levels of maximalism

The second arguments Pickney (2020) makes is “that political actors must redirect the tools of non-violent resistance from the revolutionary breakdown of power structures into institutionalized paths” (Pinckney, 2020, p. 11). Hence, *reduce maximalism*. This means the civil resistance must “shift their political and social mobilization away from revolutionary goals and tactics and into new institutionalized political channels” (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). If maximalism is high, this might foster different kind of policies and leadership, often with narrow partisan goals rather than democratic goals (Pinckney, 2020, p. 31-32). On the other hand, when a transition is characterized by low levels of maximalism, the transition negotiation reflects a more socially broad political agenda (Pinckney, 2020, p. 32). Therefore, the nature of negotiation settlements during transition are important for future democratic development. Since negotiated settlements during a transition often lead to the development and implementation of new governance structures and laws which influences the populations’ ability to participate in policy making and politics (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 997), they should strive to be characterized by low levels of maximalism.

In sum, nonviolent maximalist campaigns are more likely to lead to democratization when phase one, the breakthrough phase, is characterized by a mass-broad based participation from diverse swathes of society that is unified in its objective, tactical in its opposition, and disciplined in its nonviolent strategy. And when phase two, the transition is characterized by high degrees of mobilization capacity and low degrees of maximalism throughout the transition.

As of now I have presented “a model of democratization” in the context of civil resistance campaigns. Below I argue that women´s participation in campaigns might increase the likelihood of these mechanisms to be present.

## Democratization in the context of women participation in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns

Women’s participation in nonviolent campaigns can shape immediate and longer-term outcomes (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 1). This is evident through recent events. Political and cultural elites in addition to intelligence services did not anticipate that women would rise and take part in the popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. Their participation confounded dictatorships and their contributions have been credited for the quick downfall of several oppressive regimes (Chenoweth, 2019b; Johansson-Nogués, 2013; Karman, 2017; Khalil, 2016; Moghadam, 2014; Olimat, 2013). This is not an isolated event. In the 1970s, the first movement that highly impacted the Argentine military government was organized and lead by the “Madres” (mothers). In Chile, one of the first mass protests again the Pinochet- regime was held by women in 1978 (Waylen, 1994, p. 339).

The previous key question, *what explains why some civil resistance campaigns create democracy, while others do not*? Will now be elaborated to; *and how does women participation effect these outcomes*? Below I will present my arguments on how each of the previously presented roles can be connected to possible democratization. After each section, I present my hypotheses.

### Frontline participation

Numbers matter and women have the potential to increase campaign size by 50% (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 2). By not including women, the campaign is more likely to suffer low numbers and, hence reducing their disruptive potential (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 3). Women´s ability to increase numbers is important for several reasons. First, increasing campaign size, because of women’s participation, can also increase the perceived legitimacy and catalyze mobilization across broader swathes of society, hence making the campaign more diverse (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 4). Accordingly, the presence of women can encourage greater and more diverse participation (Principe, 2017, p. 6). As mentioned in the previous section, diversity in the campaign is important for several reasons. Among others because it increases the campaigns’ access to knowledge and resources which in turn increases mobilization capacity and the development of new tactics.

Additionally, women´s frontline participation in campaigns can increase movements capacity for tactical innovation (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 4). Improving tactical innovation is important because this will increase both the leverage and resilience of a nonviolent campaign (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Among other reasons, because it makes it more difficult for the regime to predict and adjust its counter-methods. In addition, a diverse use of methods attracts more diverse participant and hence increases mobilization capacity (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Women´s participation has the potential to wield other, political methods. For instance, women have innovated different nonviolent defensive tactics when the movements are confronted by security forces. Women have relied on the prevailing ideas of them as “victims” to pose a moral dilemma to security forces when faced with the option of using violence toward female opponents (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 98-99). In addition, women have also used their own bodies, and the idealization surrounding the use of it, as a tool for dissidence (Principe, 2017, p. 4-5). Examples of these defense tactics is creating human shields to protect participants or stripping naked to embarrass observes. These are all innovative tactics which provide protection without the need for violence or escalation.

Third, and consequently, when nonviolent campaigns feature a large number of female participants, the campaign is more likely to maintain a **nonviolent discipline** (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 2). Keeping a nonviolent discipline is one of the key elements for success. Lastly, higher levels of frontline women´s participation is associated with higher degree of elicit loyalty shifts within the opponent for instance from the security forces (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 13; Principe, 2017 p. 6). Security forces tend to be less willing to open fire on women (Principe, 2017, p. 6), which again reflect with their ability for tactical innovation. Hence, the presence of women can both increase the likelihood to maintain a nonviolent discipline and temper a violent response.

All the presented elements are important in increasing the probability of successful campaign success and hence the first phase of democratization (The opening). However, as the conceptualization of frontline participation suggests, they do not have a formal role in the campaign, but act as an informal (but important) participant. For those reasons it is difficult to assess if women´s frontline participation in nonviolent resistance campaign influence the transition phase as well 🡨 working on this.

*H1: Women´s frontline participation in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns increase the probability of successful democratization by increasing probability of successful campaigns, but does not necessary increase probability of successful democratization in the transition phase.*

### Women´s participation in campaign leadership

#### Phase 1: Campaign success (The opening)

Even though it is unlikely that skilled leadership can mobilize a civil resistance without some of the key ingredients for a movement, leaders make a difference in converting potential conditions for mobilization into actual civil resistance (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 178).

Historically, campaign leaders have disproportionately been of male sex (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 174; Snow et al., 2008, p. 180). However, since WWII, women´s leadership in campaigns has increased dramatically (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 8). This was also evident during the Arab Spring. For instance, Tawakkol Karman, the winner of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize, is known as “The Mother of Revolution” in Yemen (UN, 2012). She was at the forefront and a leader in the resistance movement, demanding human rights for all citizens, organized several nonviolent protests that increased enormously in size and became one of the most important movements in the Arab spring (UN, 2012). In fact, of the total sixteen female winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, eleven were awarded the price for leading movements against an authoritarian regime (Principe, 2017, p. 11).

In cases where women have been among campaign-leadership this has often been through function as a “bridge leaders” (Robnett, 1997, pp. 19-22). The bridge leaders operates as organizers and leaders that mediate between top leadership and the followers, turning “dreams and grand plans into on-the-ground realities” (Robnett, 1997b, p. 21). Bridge leaders affect the probability of success through their work within the movements, mobilizing the necessary support to carry out collective action tactics, which might result in concrete gains for the campaign (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 188)(ibid + Robnett, 1997). Most movements require the effort of “bridge leaders” to be able to succeed (Robnett, 1997a, p. 1700).

Women who have been in bridge-leadership positions in campaigns have organized, lead and mediated the communication between top-leadership and the participants, turning “dreams and grand plans into on-the-ground realities”(Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 188). For instance, Septima Clark was a bridge leader during the civil rights movement in the US. She went to rural communities teaching citizenship education, making sure that also African Americans in the rural areas understood the message of the movement. This is said to have increased participation in the movement (Robnett, 1997, p. 22).

In addition, many women bridge-leaders also tend to be routinely engaged in top- leadership activities (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 188; Robnett, 1997b, p. 21). Meaning that women can obtain crossed leadership-positions. Whenever women access leadership positions, either top or secondary positions, they tend to attract more diversified participant to the campaign (Snow et al., 2008, p. 180). Further, when women are involved in campaigns formal leadership structure, they diversify the leadership background, skills and viewpoints, which is important for campaign success (Snow et al., 2008, p. 180). In addition, when women are involved in campaign leadership, the campaign is more likely to maintain a nonviolent discipline and increasing the probability of security defection (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 29), which is argued as a key contributor for campaign success.

#### Phase two: The transition phase

In general, when women gain access to political leadership, they pursue different policies than male legislators. For instance, states with larger proportions of female legislators tend to produce policies that address development, social welfare and social justice, such as improving living standards, enhancing social stability and reducing incentives for violent mobilization against the state (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 999). States’ spending priorities influence the risk of experiencing civil conflict (Taydas & Peksen, 2012). Legislative bodies with greater numbers of women tend to increase their social welfare expenditures, improving key indicators of social welfare and reducing the risk of civil conflict (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 999).Moreover, elite credibility and inter-elite trust is highlighted in preserving post-conflict peace, and power-sharing mechanisms and institutions that promote good governance are expected to help promote peace, even in societies where trust is low and doubts regarding officials credibility is high (Hartzell et al., 2001; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). Female´s in political leadership do tend to gain more credibility and inter-elite trust. In addition women leaders tend to promote good governance and are generally perceived as less corrupt than men, more dedicated to earnest and honest governance and more committed to compromise (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 1000). In addition, when women access leadership positions in peacebuilding and conflict resolutions, they frequently bring important issues to the agenda that male elites tends to overlook, such as the inclusive and accessibility of processes and institutions and the plurality of citizens´ voices (Castillejo, 2016, p. 1). Further, women´s leadership positions in post-conflict peacebuilding also positive impacts gender equality and women’s rights, which are both important elements in themselves, but also critical for democratic development (Castillejo, 2016, p. 2; Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34).

However, even though transition after a resistance campaign is difficult, it seems to be more difficult if they are led by women (Thompson, 2002, p. 549). For instance, in cases where women have been part of campaign leadership move on to official offices, trying to guide the transition into a democracy, they tend to struggled with the consolidation process after the initial breakthrough (Thompson, 2002, p. 535). One factor that is argued to hinder this transition is the traditional status of women. Despite being praised for their role and contribution in the resistance, once in power they have been called to restrict themselves back to the traditional roles and leave the political business to men (Thompson, 2002, p. 550). For instance, even though Alaa Saleh, the young student who became the symbol of the Sudanese revolution in 2018-2019, succeeded in mobilizing and leading the Sudanese people through many protests, she, and other female leader figures, where sidelined during the political transition to a new regime, and excluded from critical meetings by male officials (True, 2020, p. 89; Young, 2020, p. 28).

Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this. For instance, in post-conflict Rwanda women took leadership positions and demonstrated admirable initiative in addressing the challenges of rebuilding their communities (Newbury & Baldwin, 2000, p. 6). In addition, the already mentioned Dr. Abigail Olufunmilayo Ransome- Kuti who led many anti-colonial movements in Nigeria in the 1940´s, was also a key figure in the transition to independence. In the 1950s she founded the Commoners Peoples Party to challenge the ruling party and won. She was one of the members of the delegation that successfully negotiated the independence of Nigeria with the British Colonialist (Aka, 2012, p. 28). Additionally, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, women were key actors in the transitional period. For instance, women secured 31% of seats in the country’s constitution-making body (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 1). Within the constituent assembly, women played a major role in building consensus between the opposite camps after the revolution by focusing on finding common grounds and working across partisan lines to advance shared interest (Tamura et al., 2018, p. 1).

In sum, the association between women´s leadership participation in nonviolent campaigns -and the following leadership participation during the transition, might be challenged by the lack of access. However, when women *do* gain access to campaign leadership the and leadership positions during the transition, they tend bring with them several mechanisms important for campaign success, and follow policies that are drivers for more peaceful and democratic societies, such as improving living standards, enhancing social stability, and reducing incentives for violent mobilization against the state. Based on this, the second hypothesis is

*H2: Women´s participation in campaign leadership increases the probability of successful democratization.*

### Formal women´s organization

#### Phase one: Campaign success (The opening)

Formal organizations play multiple crucial roles in civil resistance campaigns. For instance, organizations enable people to participate in campaigns in a coordinated way by providing them with incentives and motivations to act and continue to act (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 136). Women´s organizations have played a major role in several maximalist campaigns (Jaquette, 2001, p. 112; Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 183), and have been involved in about 66% of the nonviolent campaigns from 1945-2014 (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 16). Scholars argue that the collective action of historical women´s organizations explain political rights in South- Africa, Argentina, Ghana, Brazil, East Germany, Poland and El Salvador (Baldez, 2003; Viterna & Fallon, 2008; Waylen, 1993). Their presence is associated with the maintenance of nonviolent discipline and the increased likelihood of the withdrawal of support from security forces (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 16 & 21). These are important mechanism that is argued to influence a campaigns probability of success during an *opening.* In addition, formal women´s organizations have been credited for their international cooperation with other women´s groups and their ability to draw diverse participants (Jaquette, 2001, pp. 113 & 116). Women’s organizations are rarely homogeneous, particularly in terms of class compositions (Waylen, 1993). Many women´s organizations is formed on a coalition between different class, race or partisan lines (Baldez, 2003). For instance, in Uganda, several women’s organizations and movements used their autonomy and ability to organize participants across religious division and social status to enhance the democratization mobilization (Jaquette, 2001, p. 116). This is important because it will diversify the campaign, which is, as discussed, an important element that increases the probability of successful campaign outcomes.

#### The transition phase

Democratization is more likely to happen when strong and durable organizations mobilize against an autocratic regime (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 136; Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3). This probability increases additionally when the organizations participating in the campaign have a high degrees of mobilization capacities and strong and stable preferences for democracy and are unlikely to share in state power during a transition (low levels of maximalist) (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3; Pinckney, 2020). Therefore, campaigns are more likely to transition successfully to democracies with the participation of organizations that possess I) high degree of mobilization capacity, II) stable preferences for democracy, III) low degrees of maximalism. There are reasons to believe that women ‘organizations might access these mechanisms.

Women´s organizations are often old. For instance, in the Middle East women´s organization and were established simultaneously as the independent movements in each country. (Arenfeldt & Golley, 2012, pp. 12-20)[[9]](#footnote-9). Women bear the burdens when a society does not follow democratic principles (Hornset & de Soysa, 2021, p. 2). Consequently, women´s organizations tend to have democratic principles as their core goal and are important actors in the constant advocacy for a more democratic practice and holding the elites accountable (Arenfeldt & Golley, 2012, pp. 65-66). In this there is an element of durability in the fight for democracy. Based on this, there is also reason to believe that women organizations have an interest in reducing maximalism and redirect the revolutionary goals into new institutionalized democratic political channels, in accordance with the second argument (Pinckney, 2020) makes. Consequently, they are not designed to capture state power, as political parties, but rather ensure sufficient, democratic transitions. For instance, the prospect of successful peacebuilding increases when women´s organizations participate because women´s group can, and often do, represent a broader domestic participation (Gizelis, 2009, pp. 505-506 & 512).

A recent example of this mechanisms at play is the case of The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (*Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates, ATFD).* Tunisia is regarded as the country with the most successful and peaceful democratic transition after the Arab Spring (Deane, 2013; Refle, 2016; Tamaru et al., 2018). ) ATFD was one of the first politically independent organization in Tunisia and also played an instrumental role in the democratization in Tunisia, especially in the transition after the overthrown of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali´s regime (Deane, 2013, p. 13; Labidi, 2014, p. 1; Refle, 2016, p. 5). In the close aftermath of the 2011 revolution, ATFD formed a coalition of 16 like-minded organizations in order to establish a strong support base for women in the transition phase. As a result, Tunisian women secured 31% of seats in the country’s constitution-making body (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 1). The elected officials kept close cooperation with the ATFD outside the assembly, creating dialogues between the assembly members and civil society representatives making the ATFD a “(…) bridge between civil society and the assembly” (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 18). As a result ATFD, and other organizations, were at the forefront during the transition, keeping the process accountable to the people through demonstrations as well as demanding increased transparency in the assembly for citizens (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 1).

Consequently, there is reason to believe that the presence of women´s organizations in a nonviolent maximalist resistance campaign both increases probability of successful campaign outcomes and increases probability of successful transition to democracy.

*H3: The observation of women´s organization in the campaign increases probability of successful democratization*

# Data and Method

To test the presented hypothesis, two data sets are merged. The data are collected from The Women in Resistance (WiRE) dataset and Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Chenoweth, 2019a; Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Alizada, et al., 2021). The WiRE data set expands upon the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 1.2.) that includes 389 maximalist campaigns from 1945-2014 (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019). Maximalist campaigns are identified when at least 1000 people were observed mobilizing to remove an incumbent national leader, secede, remove a foreign military occupation, or expel a colonial power(Chenoweth, 2019, p. 27). The WIRE – data set expands upon this by adding additional variables that identify the scope, type, and degree of women’s participation in maximalist campaigns (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 4). The WiRE data set then provides cross-sectional data on 338 maximalist campaigns with women´s participation in every country in the world from 1945 to 2014. There are only the nonviolent campaigns that has resulted in regime change that is included in my sample.

## Dependent variable

The dependent variable is the continuous variable “democracy”, measured through egalitarian and polyarchy democracy from V-dem (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, et al., 2021). Democratization is a process that can take many years to complete (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 2). Therefore, I construct two new lead- variables (t+5 and t+10 years) for each democracy index.

**Descriptive Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | p1 | p99 | Skew. | Kurt. |
| Egalitarian democracy(t+5) | 159 | .319 | .185 | .029 | .814 | .034 | .802 | .758 | 2.814 |
| Egalitarian democracy(t+10) | 130 | .343 | .199 | .034 | .798 | .047 | .772 | .664 | 2.42 |
| Polyarchy democracy(t+5) | 159 | .445 | .231 | .069 | .896 | .074 | .889 | .161 | 1.939 |
| Polyarchy democracy(t+10) | 130 | .471 | .246 | .071 | .881 | .074 | .875 | .075 | 1.778 |

## Independent variable (women´s participation)

To test if women’s’ participation in a nonviolent resistance campaign is associated with democratization, I will test the association of each role presented in the theory chapter on the democracy score five and ten years after the campaign ends. As mentioned, I will test three participatory roles women can take on during a nonviolent resistance campaign: frontline roles, leadership roles and through formal women´s organizations. The variables that measure the observation of the roles are dichotomous and are all taken from the WiRE data set (Chenoweth, 2019a).

**Descriptive Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | p1 | p99 | Skew. | Kurt. |
| Women observed in frontline roles | 149 | .362 | .482 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | .572 | 1.328 |
| Women observed in leadership roles | 148 | .608 | .49 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | -.443 | 1.196 |
| Formal Women’s' Groups Involved in Campaign | 149 | .664 | .474 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | -.696 | 1.485 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |

## Control variables

I have five control variables. Of these five, democracy, female empowerment, GDP per capita is lagged (t-1). I also include region fixed effects. In the interaction tables, the dichotomized variables “success” is included as well.

## Method

### Ordinary least squares (OLS

I estimate 12 tables and 24 models when testing the association between female participation in a nonviolent campaign and democracy. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).

# Results

The following shows OLS- regression models. Each table contains eight models. Models 1-4 show bivariate models with only the dependent (egalitarian and polyarchy democracy) and independent variable (frontline roles). Models 1-2 show models of the egalitarian democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaign ends, while models 3 and 4 show models for the polyarchy democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaigns ends. Models 5-8 shows the output of multivariate regression that measure the effect of women´s participation, and the other control variables, on the democracy score five and ten years after campaign end. Models 5 and 6 show egalitarian democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaign ends, while models 7 and 8 show polyarchy democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaigns ends. East- Europe and Central Asia is the reference category for the region- variable.

# Frontline participation

### Table X OLS regression- Women in **frontline roles** and democracy score

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 |
| **Women´s frontline participation** | -0.00137 | 0.0593 | -0.0114 | 0.0829 | -0.00210 | 0.0331 | -0.00729 | 0.0452 |
|  | (-0.04) | (1.44) | (-0.29) | (1.68) | (-0.07) | (0.92) | (-0.18) | (0.91) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Egalitarian democracyt-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.718\*\*\* | 0.753\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.23) | (3.76) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female political empowermentt-1 |  |  |  |  | -0.164 | -0.373\* | 0.189 | -0.209 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.26) | (-2.46) | (1.10) | (-1.00) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capitat-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.0517\* | 0.0944\*\*\* | 0.0495 | 0.0929\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.51) | (3.80) | (1.77) | (2.76) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Latin- America and the Caribbean |  |  |  |  | -0.00793 | -0.0573 | 0.144 | 0.0556 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.17) | (-1.09) | (1.97) | (0.65) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MENA |  |  |  |  | -0.208\*\*\* | -0.321\*\* | -0.191\* | -0.341\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-3.86) | (-3.13) | (-2.43) | (-2.33) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa |  |  |  |  | -0.0434 | -0.0120 | 0.0165 | 0.0172 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.88) | (-0.20) | (0.24) | (0.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| W. Europe and N. America |  |  |  |  | 0.0570 | 0.00407 | 0.112 | 0.0231 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.67) | (0.04) | (0.97) | (0.18) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asia and pacific |  |  |  |  | -0.0831\* | -0.0894 | -0.0455 | -0.0753 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.98) | (-1.90) | (-0.77) | (-1.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy democracyt-1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.241 | 0.348 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.59) | (1.90) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 0.322\*\*\* | 0.329\*\*\* | 0.457\*\*\* | 0.457\*\*\* | -0.125 | -0.350 | -0.143 | -0.269 |
|  | (16.22) | (14.88) | (18.91) | (17.21) | (-0.68) | (-1.60) | (-0.57) | (-0.91) |
| *N* | 144 | 117 | 144 | 117 | 129 | 105 | 129 | 105 |

*t* statistics in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

As mentioned, models 1-8 consists of both bivariate and multivariate regression models. As we can see, models 1-8 show no significant association between female frontline participation in campaigns and future democracy score.

#### Figure X. Predicted mean- Margins plot

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of the democracy score (t+10) when there is none/limited and moderate/extensive frontline participation of women.



Both figures predict that the democracy score increases a bit more when there is moderate/extensive participation of women compared to none/limited frontline participation.

### Interaction model - Women in frontline roles, campaign success and democracy score

The following is a table consisting of four interaction models between a dummy predictor and a dummy moderator and illustrate an interaction between women participating in frontline roles in a campaign and campaign success on the egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score five (t+5) and ten (t+10) years after campaign end. This is included to see if the effect of women´s participation depends on success, as suggested by Marks and Chenoweth (2020). Models 1-2 show the egalitarian democracy score five and ten years after a campaign. Models 3-4 show the polyarchy democracy score five and ten years after a campaign. Success is a dichotomized variable, with values 0 (no success) and 1 (success).

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Egalitarian democracy t+5 | Egalitarian democracy t+10 | Polyarchy  democracy t+5 | Polyarchy  democracy t+10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **No/limited observations** of female frontline participation and **campaign success** | 0.0903\* | 0.0560 | 0.172\*\*\* | 0.131\* |
|  | (2.43) | (1.28) | (3.83) | (2.47) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Moderate/extensive** female frontline participation, but **no campaign success** | -0.0874 | -0.0730 | -0.0583 | 0.00492 |
|  | (-1.89) | (-1.15) | (-1.04) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Moderate/extensive** female frontline participation and **campaign success** | 0.166\*\*\* | 0.201\*\*\* | 0.218\*\*\* | 0.271\*\*\* |
|  | (3.87) | (3.70) | (4.20) | (4.13) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 0.264\*\*\* | 0.292\*\*\* | 0.348\*\*\* | 0.370\*\*\* |
|  | (8.89) | (8.21) | (9.70) | (8.62) |
| *N* | 144 | 117 | 144 | 117 |

*t* statistics in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

The interactions indicate a strong association between campaign success and female frontline participation on future democracy score. When a campaign features moderate/extensive female participation and succeeds, the democracy score increases more in all models compared to successful campaigns with none/limited frontline participation. This indicates that successful campaigns with more women´s participation are more likely to democratize, compared to successful campaigns with none/limited women´s participation. This also suggests, as expected, that the effect of women´s participation in frontline roles, might depend on campaign success.

There is also indication that the effect of success on the democracy score is *independent* of women´s frontline participation. In campaigns with no/limited observations of female participation in frontline roles and campaign success, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on the democracy score in all models except model 2 (egalitarian democracy ten years after campaign end).

Overall, campaign success has a bigger effect on future democracy score when it features moderate/extensive women´s frontline participation. This association is somewhat stronger on the polyarchy democracy score than egalitarian democracy score.

#### Predicted mean- MARGINS PLOT

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) with the interaction between success and women´s frontline participation.

The figure showing the predicted democracy score for egalitarian democracy (t+10) indicates that in unsuccessful campaigns (blue line) with none/limited women´s participation the democracy score decreases with about one percentage point. Like the findings of Chenoweth & Marks (2020, p. 5), the egalitarian democracy score decreases after unsuccessful campaigns that features women´s participation. However, future polyarchy democracy score remains unchanged after unsuccessful campaigns with women´s participation.

## Women in formal campaign leadership

### Table X: OLS regression- Women in formal leadership roles and democracy score

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 |
| Women in campaign leadership | 0.0220 | 0.0502 | 0.0331 | 0.0870 | 0.0329 | 0.0526 | 0.0468 | 0.0790 |
|  | (0.68) | (1.32) | (0.84) | (1.92) | (1.21) | (1.66) | (1.26) | (1.82) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Egalitarian democracy  t-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.736\*\*\* | 0.767\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.34) | (3.87) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female political empowerment t-1 |  |  |  |  | -0.171 | -0.376\* | 0.185 | -0.217 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.32) | (-2.51) | (1.07) | (-1.05) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capitat-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.0527\* | 0.0992\*\*\* | 0.0509 | 0.100\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.58) | (4.04) | (1.83) | (3.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Latin- America and the Caribbean |  |  |  |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MENA |  |  |  |  | -0.00618 | -0.0503 | 0.145 | 0.0622 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.13) | (-0.97) | (1.98) | (0.74) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa |  |  |  |  | -0.211\*\*\* | -0.280\*\* | -0.194\* | -0.285\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-3.96) | (-2.81) | (-2.49) | (-2.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| W. Europe and N. America |  |  |  |  | -0.0367 | -0.00158 | 0.0251 | 0.0318 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.74) | (-0.03) | (0.36) | (0.37) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asia and pacific |  |  |  |  | 0.0616 | 0.00771 | 0.120 | 0.0281 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.73) | (0.08) | (1.04) | (0.22) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy democracy  t-1 |  |  |  |  | -0.0768 | -0.0809 | -0.0379 | -0.0645 |
| Egalitarian democracy  t-1 |  |  |  |  | (-1.82) | (-1.73) | (-0.63) | (-0.95) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.255 | 0.366\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.68) | (2.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 0.308\*\*\* | 0.317\*\*\* | 0.434\*\*\* | 0.430\*\*\* | -0.158 | -0.421 | -0.192 | -0.374 |
|  | (12.06) | (10.88) | (13.95) | (12.35) | (-0.86) | (-1.91) | (-0.77) | (-1.27) |
| *N* | 143 | 117 | 143 | 117 | 128 | 105 | 128 | 105 |

*t* statistics in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

None of the models indicates a significant association between women in campaign leadership and future democracy score.

#### Figure 3.1. Predicted mean- Margins plot

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) in campaigns with and without women in leadership.



Both figures indicates that the predicted democracy score increases more when women are part of campaign leadership, compared to no women in campaign leadership. Having women in campaign leadership increases the predicted polyarchy democracy score more than the predicted egalitarian democracy ten years after campaign end.

### Table 4: Interaction model- Women in leadership, campaign success and democracy score

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy  democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy  democracy  t+10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **No observation** of women in campaign leadership, but **campaign success** | 0.0510 | 0.00457 | 0.106\* | 0.0484 |
|  | (1.16) | (0.09) | (2.01) | (0.77) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Women in** campaign leadership, but **no campaign success** | -0.0777 | -0.0789 | -0.0826 | -0.0657 |
|  | (-1.84) | (-1.49) | (-1.61) | (-1.03) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Women in** campaign leadership **and**  **campaign success** | 0.113\*\* | 0.0959\* | 0.180\*\*\* | 0.172\*\* |
|  | (2.85) | (2.02) | (3.73) | (3.00) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 0.288\*\*\* | 0.324\*\*\* | 0.381\*\*\* | 0.410\*\*\* |
|  | (8.88) | (8.35) | (9.70) | (8.72) |
| *N* | 158 | 130 | 158 | 130 |

*t* statistics in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

The table suggest that future democracy score increases in successful campaign where women have been a part of formal campaign leadership. This association is stronger for the polyarchy democracy index than the egalitarian democracy index. Additionally, in successful campaigns with no women in leadership positions, the polyarchy democracy score (t+5) increases by 0.106 units. However, in successful campaigns with women in leadership positions, the polyarchy democracy (t+5) score increases by 0.180 units, indicating that the combined effect of campaign success and women´s participation in leadership positions has a greater association with future polyarchy democracy score, compared to successful campaigns without women in leadership positions. This indicates that having women in leadership positions matters for democratization.

#### Figure X Predicted mean- MARGINS PLOT

The figures below show the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) based on the interaction between success and women´s participation in campaign leadership.

Both figures suggest that the predicted democracy score ten years after a successful campaign increases more when women are a part of campaign leadership, compared to when there are no women in leadership positions. When women are a part of campaign leadership in unsuccessful campaigns, the democracy score decreases. As with frontline participation, the predicted egalitarian democracy score decreases more after an unsuccessful campaign where women have been part of campaign leadership, compared to campaigns where women have not been a part of campaign leadership. This might indicate that the argument of increased desire for revenge on women from autocratic actors after participation in campaigns might transcended beyond frontline participation and also account for women in formal campaign positions.

More interestingly, the polyarchy democracy score decreases when women have been part of campaign leadership in unsuccessful campaigns, which remained unchanged in the previous section (frontline participation). Even though this is a slight decline, this could suggest that when women participate in formal campaign positions, as campaign leaders, autocratic actors might retaliate even harsher compared to women´s informal frontline participation. The possible retaliation after an unsuccessful campaign with women as campaign leaders seems to also affect institutional democracy, by a decrease in the polyarchy democracy score.

## Formal women´s organizations

### Table X: OLS regression- Formal women´s organization and democracy score

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 |
| Participation of formal women´s organization | 0.0299 | 0.0800\* | 0.0708 | 0.162\*\*\* | 0.0600\* | 0.0917\*\* | 0.102\*\* | 0.149\*\*\* |
|  | (0.90) | (2.08) | (1.76) | (3.61) | (2.11) | (2.90) | (2.64) | (3.49) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Egalitarian democracyt-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.724\*\*\* | 0.740\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.35) | (3.85) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female political empowermentt-1 |  |  |  |  | -0.149 | -0.339\* | 0.232 | -0.129 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.16) | (-2.33) | (1.38) | (-0.65) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capitat-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.0502\* | 0.0955\*\*\* | 0.0467 | 0.0936\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.50) | (4.01) | (1.73) | (2.95) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Latin- America and the Caribbean |  |  |  |  | -0.0176 | -0.0704 | 0.131 | 0.0436 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.38) | (-1.39) | (1.84) | (0.54) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MENA |  |  |  |  | -0.225\*\*\* | -0.301\*\* | -0.219\*\* | -0.306\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-4.35) | (-3.14) | (-2.93) | (-2.28) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa |  |  |  |  | -0.0496 | -0.0281 | 0.00809 | -0.00156 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.03) | (-0.50) | (0.12) | (-0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| W. Europe and N. America |  |  |  |  | 0.0657 | 0.0120 | 0.131 | 0.0441 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.79) | (0.13) | (1.17) | (0.36) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asia and pacific |  |  |  |  | -0.0785 | -0.0872 | -0.0365 | -0.0663 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-1.91) | (-1.93) | (-0.63) | (-1.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Polyarchy democracyt-1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.228 | 0.306 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.55) | (1.77) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 0.301\*\*\* | 0.295\*\*\* | 0.406\*\*\* | 0.378\*\*\* | -0.161 | -0.420\* | -0.207 | -0.387 |
|  | (11.18) | (9.58) | (12.46) | (10.54) | (-0.89) | (-1.99) | (-0.86) | (-1.38) |
| *N* | 144 | 117 | 144 | 117 | 129 | 105 | 129 | 105 |

*t* statistics in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

In the bivariate models (1-4) participation of formal women´s organizations in campaigns are positive and significant in models 2 and 4. This suggests that the association between the participation of formal women´s organizations and democracy is stronger in medium term (t+10) than short term (t+5), and more so for polyarchy democracy than egalitarian democracy. The association between women´s organizations in campaigns and future democracy scores becomes stronger in the multivariate models. Models 5-8 show that the participation of formal women´s organizations is positive and significantly associated with increased egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score. The strongest effect is on the polyarchy score (t+10), indicating that when formal women´s organizations participate in a campaign, the future polyarchy democracy score increases by near 0.15 units. Compared, the egalitarian democracy score (t+10) increases by 0.0917units. These findings suggest that the participation of women´s organization in campaigns matters for democratization.

#### Figure X: Predicted mean- Margins plot

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) in campaigns with and without participation of women´s organization.



### Table X: Interaction model- Formal women´s organizations, campaign success and democracy score

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Egalitarian democracy  t+5 | Egalitarian democracy  t+10 | Polyarchy democracy  t+5 | Polyarchy democracy  t+10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **No observations** of formal women´s organizations, but **campaign success** | 0.142\*\* | 0.132\* | 0.222\*\*\* | 0.211\*\* |
|  | (2.75) | (2.13) | (3.68) | (2.98) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Observation** of formal women´s organization, but **no campaign success** | 0.0245 | 0.0929 | 0.0854 | 0.205\*\* |
|  | (0.49) | (1.48) | (1.46) | (2.88) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Observation** of formal women´s organization and **campaign success** | 0.183\*\*\* | 0.203\*\*\* | 0.295\*\*\* | 0.346\*\*\* |
|  | (3.89) | (3.57) | (5.35) | (5.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | 0.211\*\*\* | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.266\*\*\* | 0.242\*\*\* |
|  | (5.15) | (4.22) | (5.53) | (4.28) |
| *N* | 144 | 117 | 144 | 117 |

*t* statistics in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

As with the other interaction models it suggests that the effect of success on future democracy score can operate independently from the participation of women´s organization. However, and as a first, there is also a positive and significant association between observation of formal women´s organization on the polyarchy democracy score ten years after campaign end, even in cases where the campaign failed. In failed campaigns with the participation of formal women´s organization the polyarchy democracy score still increases by 0.205 units ten years after campaign ends. This suggest that the effect of participation of formal women´s organizations in a campaign does not necessarily depend on a successful outcome but is positively and independently associated with future polyarchy democracy score.

#### Table X: Predicted mean- MARGINS PLOT

The figures below show the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) based on the interaction between success and the participation of women´s organization in campaigns.



Both figures suggest that the predicted democracy score ten years after a campaign increases when formal women´s organizations participate, even in situations when campaigns have failed.

# Discussion

Working on it ☺

# Bibliography

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic backwardness in political perspective. *American political science review*, *100*(1), 115-131.

Ackerman, P., & Merriman, H. (2014). The Checklist for Ending Tyranny *hardymerriman.com*. <https://hardymerriman.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/A_Checklist_for_Ending_Tyranny.pdf>

Ansell, B. W., & Samuels, D. J. (2014). *Inequality and democratization*. Cambridge University Press.

Arenfeldt, P., & Golley, N. A.-H. (2012). *Mapping Arab women's movements: A century of transformations from within*. Oxford University Press.

Baldez, L. (2003). Women's movements and democratic transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland. *Comparative Politics*, 253-272.

Binnendijk, A. L., & Marovic, I. (2006). Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence state security forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004). *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *39*(3), 411-429.

Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.

Brinton, M. C. (1993). *Women and the economic miracle*. University of California Press.

Burton, M., Gunther, R., & Higley, J. (1992). Introduction: elite transformations and democratic regimes. *Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 1-37.

Butcher, C., Braithwaite, J. M., Pinckney, J., Haugseth, E., Bakken, I. V., & Wishman, M. S. (2022). Introducing the Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 00223433211029512.

Butcher, C., Gray, J. L., & Mitchell, L. (2018). Striking it free? Organized labor and the outcomes of civil resistance. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *3*(3), 302-321.

Caprioli, M., Nielsen, R., & Hudson, V. M. (2010). Women and Post-Conflict Settings. *Peace and Conflict*, 91-102.

Castillejo, C. (2016). Women political leaders and peacebuilding. *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF): Norway*.

Celestino, M. R., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2013). Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(3), 385-400.

Chenoweth, E. (2019a). Women in Resistance Dataset, version 1. *Harvard Dataverse*, *3*.

Chenoweth, E. (2019b). Women’s participation and the fate of nonviolent campaigns. *ICNC Special Report Series*.

Chenoweth, E. (2021). *Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know®*. Oxford University Press.

Chenoweth, E., Stephan, M. J., & Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. Columbia University Press.

Collier, R. B., & Mahoney, J. (1999). 5. Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe. In *Transitions to democracy* (pp. 97-119). Columbia University Press.

Conover, P. J., & Sapiro, V. (1993). Gender, feminist consciousness, and war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1079-1099.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Alizada, N., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., & Fish, M. S. (2021). V-Dem Dataset v11. 1.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, M. S., & Gastaldi, L. (2021). V-Dem Codebook v11.

Dahlum, S., Knutsen, C. H., & Wig, T. (2019). Who revolts? Empirically revisiting the social origins of democracy. *The Journal of Politics*, *81*(4), 1494-1499.

Dahlum, S., & Wig, T. (2020). Peace above the glass ceiling: The historical relationship between female political empowerment and civil conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, *64*(4), 879-893.

Deane, S. (2013). Transforming Tunisia: The role of civil society in Tunisia’s transition. *International Alert*, *28*.

Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2020). *Social movements: An introduction*. John Wiley & Sons.

Eglitis, D., & Zelče, V. (2013). Unruly actors: Latvian women of the Red Army in post-war historical memory. *Nationalities Papers*, *41*(6), 987-1007.

Flammang, J. A. (1997). *Women's political voice: How women are transforming the practice and study of politics*. Temple University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1977). In a different voice: Women's conceptions of self and of morality. *Harvard educational review*, *47*(4), 481-517.

Gizelis, T.-I. (2009). Gender empowerment and United Nations peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research*, *46*(4), 505-523.

Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing peace: power sharing and post‐civil war conflict management. *American Journal of Political Science*, *47*(2), 318-332.

Hartzell, C., Hoddie, M., & Rothchild, D. (2001). Stabilizing the peace after civil war: An investigation of some key variables. *International Organization*, *55*(1), 183-208.

Hartzell, C. A., & Hoddie, M. (2015). The art of the possible: Power sharing and post—civil war democracy. *World politics*, *67*(1), 37-71.

Jaquette, J. (2018). *The women's movement in Latin America: participation and democracy*. Routledge.

Jaquette, J. S. (2001). Women and democracy: regional differences and contrasting views. *Journal of democracy*, *12*(3), 111-125.

Johansson-Nogués, E. (2013). Gendering the Arab Spring? Rights and (in) security of Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan women. *Security Dialogue*, *44*(5-6), 393-409.

Karman, T. (2017). Women and the Arab spring. *UN Chronicle*, *53*(4), 21-22.

Khalil, A. (2016). *Gender, women and the Arab spring*. Routledge.

Krause, J., Krause, W., & Bränfors, P. (2018). Women’s participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace. *International Interactions*, *44*(6), 985-1016.

Labidi, L. (2014). Electoral practice of Tunisian women in the context of a democratic transition. *Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center,[nd])[online]. Available from:* [*https://www*](https://www)*. wilsoncenter. org/sites/default/files/electoral\_practice\_of\_tunisian \_women\_in\_the\_context\_of\_a\_democratic\_transition. pdf [Accessed: 22 June 2015]*.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American political science review*, *53*(1), 69-105.

Marks, Z., & Chenoweth, E. (2020). Women’s Participation for Peaceful Change. *FBA*.

McAdam, D. (1999). *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970*. University of Chicago Press.

Moghadam, V. M. (2014). Democratization and women's political leadership in North Africa. *Journal of International Affairs*, 59-78.

Moore, B. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. *Boston: Beacon*.

Morris, A. D., & Staggenborg, S. (2004). Leadership in social movements. *The Blackwell companion to social movements*, 171-196.

Murdie, A., & Peksen, D. (2015). Women and contentious politics: A global event-data approach to understanding women’s protest. *Political Research Quarterly*, *68*(1), 180-192.

Newbury, C., & Baldwin, H. (2000). Aftermath: women in postgenocide Rwanda. *USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation Working Paper*, *303*, 1-12.

O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & Whitehead, L. (1986). *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Comparative perspectives* (Vol. 3). JHU Press.

Oakley, A., & Cracknell, J. (1981). *Subject women*. Pantheon Books New York.

Olimat, M. (2013). *Arab Spring and Arab Women*. Routledge.

Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American political science review*, *87*(3), 567-576.

Peeler, J. A. (1992). Elite settlements and democratic consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. *Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 81-112.

Pinckney, J., Butcher, C., & Braithwaite, J. M. (2022). Organizations, Resistance, and Democracy: How Civil Society Organizations Impact Democratization. *International Studies Quarterly*.

Pinckney, J. C. (2020). *From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions*. Oxford University Press.

Principe, M. (2017 ). Women in Nonviolent Movements *United States Institute of Peace Special Report 399*.

Przeworski, A. (1988). Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts. In *Constitutionalism and democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997). Modernization: Theories and facts. *World politics*, *49*(2), 155-183.

Refle, J.-E. (2016). Tunisia–how existent networks restrain the inclusion of the new Tunisian civil society.

Robnett, B. (1997a). Commentary and Debate: Formal Titles and Bridge Leaders: Reply to Keys. *American Journal of Sociology*, *102*(6), 1698-1701.

Robnett, B. (1997b). *How long? How long? : African-American women in the struggle for civil rights*. Oxford University Press.

Rosen, S. (1995). Women and political participation in China. *Pacific Affairs*, 315-341.

SC, U. (2000). Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Schaftenaar, S. (2017). How (wo) men rebel: Exploring the effect of gender equality on nonviolent and armed conflict onset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *54*(6), 762-776.

Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies* (Vol. 22). U of Minnesota Press.

Shair-Rosenfield, S., & Wood, R. M. (2017). Governing well after war: How improving female representation prolongs post-conflict peace. *The Journal of Politics*, *79*(3), 995-1009.

Sharp, G. (1973). The politics of nonviolent action, 3 vols. *Boston: Porter Sargent*, *2*.

Sjoberg, L., & Whooley, J. (2015). The Arab Spring for women? Representations of women in Middle East politics in 2011. *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, *36*(3), 261-284.

Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., & Kriesi, H. (2008). *The Blackwell companion to social movements*. John Wiley & Sons.

Stephens, J. D. (1989). Democratic transition and breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A test of the Moore thesis. *American Journal of Sociology*, *94*(5), 1019-1077.

Tamaru, N., Holt-Ivry, O., & O’Reilly, M. (2018). Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia. *Institute for Inclusive Security.* [*https://www*](https://www)*. inclusivesecurity. org/publication/beyond-revolution-women-influenced-constitution-making-tunisia*.

Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics.

Taydas, Z., & Peksen, D. (2012). Can states buy peace? Social welfare spending and civil conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research*, *49*(2), 273-287.

Teele, D. L. (2018). Democratization and the Case of Women. In *Forging the Franchise: The Political Origins of the Women's Vote* (pp. 15-48). Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/doi:10.1515/9780691184272-004>

Thompson, M. R. (2002). Female leadership of democratic transitions in Asia. *Pacific Affairs*, *75*(4), 535-555.

Tnani, N. (2020). Tunisian Women at the Crossroad: Between a Feminist Spring and an Islamist Winter. *Al-Raida Journal*, 35-44.

Tripp, A. M. (2015). *Women and power in post-conflict Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

True, J. (2020). Continuums of violence and peace: A feminist perspective. *Ethics & International Affairs*, *34*(1), 85-95.

Viterna, J., & Fallon, K. M. (2008). Democratization, women's movements, and gender-equitable states: A framework for comparison. *American sociological review*, *73*(4), 668-689.

Waylen, G. (1993). Women's movements and democratisation in Latin America. *Third World Quarterly*, *14*(3), 573-587.

Waylen, G. (1994). Women and democratization conceptualizing gender relations in transition politics. *World politics*, *46*(3), 327-354.

Webster, K., Chen, C., & Beardsley, K. (2019). Conflict, peace, and the evolution of women's empowerment. *International Organization*, *73*(2), 255-289.

Wood, E. J. (2001). An insurgent path to democracy: Popular mobilization, economic interests, and regime transition in South Africa and El Salvador. *Comparative Political Studies*, *34*(8), 862-888.

Wyndow, P., Li, J., & Mattes, E. (2013). Female empowerment as a core driver of democratic development: A dynamic panel model from 1980 to 2005. *World Development*, *52*, 34-54.

Young, S. (2020). THE WOMEN'S REVOLUTION: FEMALE ACTIVISM IN SUDAN. *Harvard International Review*, *41*(3), 26-28.

1. This resolution called for the “strengthening of women’s and girls’ protection from conflict-related sexual violence and women´s equal participation in all stages of the prevention and resolution of conflict and women’s participation in peace negotiations” SC, U. (2000). Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. There is currently and ongoing research, expanding on this study, about the impact of women´s participation on revolutionary outcomes, but this work is yet to be published. I emailed Professor Chenoweth in January 2022 who said the book was still in draft form. <https://www.radcliffe.harvard.edu/event/2022-erica-chenoweth-fellow-presentation-virtual>. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For instance, Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Ansell and Samuels (2014) provides strong evidence that high levels of inequality threaten both the survival and quality of democracy [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The consolidation aspect will also be dicussed… [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Others estimates the crowd to be 20 percent female (ibid). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. From 1900-2019, maximalist nonviolent campaigns that faced violent repression from the regime succeeded 45% of the time, compared to violent ones who only succeeded 22% of the time (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 89). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Democracy is not the only aim for many campaigns. These can also include social, economic, and racial justice. However, democracy and democratic institutions are often a prerequisite for realizing these broader goals (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 241). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. By this I mean actors that was not previously a part of the old regime. For instance This was the case in Tunis after the Arab Spring in 2011 where the initial transitional government was dominated by figures from the old Ben Ali regime. Consequently, Tunisia´s civil society demanded the transition to be led by people outside the Ben Ali regime which successfully led to the creation of a body of representatives from civil society and opposition parties that was involved in the mobilization against the regime in the first place, and who played a key role in the transition phase as well (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For example, Palestinian Women´s Union in 1919 and Women´s Awakening Club in Iraq in 1923. Several other groups formed after the second world war, like the Women´s Adeni Women´s Club in Aden in 1940s, Women´s Associations in Yemen in 1950s and 1960s, Jordanian Women´s Movements in 1960s and Nadi-Al Fatat (Girls Club) in Kuwait in 1970s Arenfeldt, P., & Golley, N. A.-H. (2012). *Mapping Arab women's movements: A century of transformations from within*. Oxford University Press. . [↑](#footnote-ref-9)